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On the basis of Stephany Griffith-Jones' study 
of the early years of the Communist government 
in the Soviet Union, the Leftist coalition in 
Czechoslovakia after the war, and the Unidad 
Popular administration in Chile, it is possible 
to draw some general conclusions (which can also 
be supported by evidence from Cuba, Portugal, 
Jamaica, Britain, etc ), Left-wing governments 
tend to lack firm monetary policies, and suffer 
not merely from a 'strike of capital' and external 
intervention but also from acute inflation, foreign 
exchange difficulties, etc. This problem leads, 
possibly by political coups, to policy reversals, 
usually accompanied by political repression. As 
Stephany says, it is precisely socialist governments 
which most need a tight monetary policy.
1/ I am grateful not only to Stephany Griffith- 
Jones for discussions on my interpretation of the 
implications of her work, but also to David Evans 
for some shrewd and constructive suggestions for 
reconstructing and expanding this preface. The 
responsibility, however, remains mine alone.
1A pattern is visible in the life of socialist regimes. 
Grasping the levers of state power generates euphoria.
Now at last they can raise wages, subsidise food prices, 
launch housing schemes, increase social services, build 
schools and hospitals, etc., etc. At the same time 
large fragments of the private sector can be taken over 
and made to serve public interest, not private profit.
There is of course very good justification for such 
measures. Objectively, no doubt, they are all essential. 
Moreover, they are expected by the working classes and 
the left-wing intelligentsia that has helped the govern­
ment to power. To refrain from carrying them out may 
cost important political support, especially in the 
trade unions. But a terrible price has to be paid. 
Typically inflation gathers pace, and the economic 
situation deteriorates, leading eventually to political 
crisis, a complete reversal of policy, and often of the 
social gains.
As Stephany Griffith-Jones shows, it is precisely a 
socialist government, not a 1 conservative one, .that most 
needs deliberate and strict financial policy, especially 
on the budget, the rate of Interest and wages. This is 
not merely because m o n e t a r y  stability is required for 
controls to operate efficiently and for the price 
mechanism to work in the sectors which cannot be controlled, 
at least for some years. Inflation typically jeopardises 
the balance of payments just at a time when opponents 
outside and inside the country may be trying to deprive 
it of foreign exchange, causing shortages of fuel, 
industrial inputs, food, etc. These shortages further 
aggravate inflation and make structural change difficult 
if not impossible to carry out.
A socialist government is naturally much plotted against. 
There are always high-ranking officers and foreign 
government officials only too willing to engineer the 
downfall of a government of this hue, if need be by 
violence. They are to 'blame' for what happens, of 
course, but - and this is something that has to be faced - 
a government which loses control of the economy plays 
into their hands and sets itself up for a coup.
Those socialist governments which have survived the 
traumas of birth and childishness have grown up to be 
extremely careful about their financial health, guarding 
their foreign exchange reserves with scrupulous care and 
imposing balanced budgets not merely in their own accounts 
but throughout the range of public institutions. From 
financial irresponsibility - and partly because of its
2effects - they swing to the opposite extreme, a crude 
version of monetarism, accompanied by political repression.
The three case histories in this book illustrate this 
cycle in a way invaluable for socialists who are in office 
or who hope to gain power in the future.
The Soviet experience immediately after the revolution of 
1917 is still relevant. In the period known as 'War 
Communism', as Stephany shows, the inherited supply 
problems and price inflation were aggravated by a romantic 
desire to play down the importance of money or even 
abolish it. Only the exhaustion of the capitalist powers 
at the end of the war, plus the size and geographical 
remoteness of the Soviet Union, protected the revolution­
ary state from effective foreign intervention (such as helped 
topple Bela Kun in Hungary shortly afterwards).
Yet financial policies had to be imposed eventually.
After 1922 the direction was completely reversed. The 
New Economic Policy then adopted would in many respects 
have gratified the most doctrinaire member 
of the IMF staff. To balance the budget, taxes were 
increased; part of social expenditure was made the 
responsibility of state and local authorities; and 
government administrative staff were reduced by more 
than 50 per cent. The increase in the money supply 
was halted and the currency was backed by gold. Wages 
were frozen, ensuring a sharp fall in their real value 
and the consequent strikes were repressed, often with 
violence; trade unions were brought under government 
control. Moreover, tax and price policies were 
manipulated to provide 'incentives' to peasants and 
traders. (These were apparently excessively generous 
reflecting a rather simplistic 'class analysis' that 
emphasised the need to gain the support of the peasantry 
and petit bourgeoisie). The rise in production was 
accelerated, inflation slowed down and foreign payments 
were brought back into balance. The regime survived - 
but, not surprisingly, the result of such a drastic 
stabilisation policy was a rapid increase in inequality 
and unemployment. To repress the resistance that 
these generated was one of the 'objective' justifications 
for the Stalinist terror.
In Czechoslovakia after the Second World War, the govern­
ment, at first a coalition, confronted the problems of 
post-war chaos with a very similar naivete, its leaders 
declaring that the job of financial policy was simply
3to mobilise money for whatever investment was physically 
possible. Among many gems of official wisdom quoted 
by the author, one stands out; in a planned economy a 
Czech socialist proclaimed; "there can be no inflation 
unless the authorities wish it"!
While the government did adopt some measures to reduce 
excess demand, credits to the public sector grew rapidly. 
Price controls were partly ineffective and black markets 
flourished long after the war had ended. (This was in 
fact used by the Communist Party as a reason, not for 
better financial policy, but for further nationalisation.) 
The consequent economic problems, together with a 
deterioration in relations between the socialist and 
capitalist blocs, contributed to the overthrow of the 
coalition by the Communists in 1948. There was a 
shift towards financial orthodoxy which was facilitated 
by Communist control of the trade unions, but it was 
accompanied by (and not unrelated to) increasing political 
repression, which became severe in the 1950s.
In parts of the world further from the reach of the Red 
Army, socialist governments cannot be saved from the 
consequences of financial irresponsibility; on the 
contrary, internal and external enemies can combine to 
exploit these with every prospect of success. A prime 
example is the third case study in the book, the Allende 
administration in Chile. As the author (herself an 
official in this regime) recognises, it is difficult to 
criticise the 'Popular Unity' government without seeming 
to exonerate the military officers, who overthrew it 
with US support. However, analysing its mistakes may 
help others to avoid repeating them yet again.
Unfortunately, the Allende government did not draw on - 
probably for the most part did not know of - the experience 
of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Their attitudes 
had been formed, naturally enough, rather by the struggle, 
since the Second World War, against the naiveties of 
'monetarism* in Latin America. They saw the fundamental 
problems as 'structural': finance was of quite secondary
importance. Theories of "planning" then current in Latin 
America carried the implication that social problems 
could be solved by inverting input-output matrixes and 
building 'consistent' projections for some imaginary future. 
Versions of Keynesianism almost as naive implied that 
what was physically possible must be financially possible 
too, reinforcing the tendency to hive off financial 
policy and down-play its importance.
4Many simplistic errors were made by government economists 
in the analysis of Chile's problems. Indeed since 
inflation was due to structural problems, the structural 
reforms they planned would be accompanied by growing 
monetary stability. There was spare capacity in both 
labour and capital and they could count on an acceleration in 
economic growth. Their very electoral programme set 
the stage for economic crises by promising on the one 
hand, big increases in wages, on the other no 
simultaneous "imperialist devaluation".
However, there were considerable organisational problems 
about actually carrying out the reforms and mobilising 
the surplus capacity. Moreover, the fiscal deficit 
climbed rapidly, as the author shows. Revenue was 
falling far short of what was needed (partly because 
of insufficient government strength in Congress to 
legislate higher taxes, partly due to a fall in the 
price of copper). Yet the government was unable to 
curb expenditure, and public sector wages showed very 
big increases. (In Chile the trade unions could not 
be so easily converted into state instruments as in the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.) Since prices were 
controlled, the results were enormous deficits in the 
public corporations, the number of which was growing 
rapidly as the main companies were taken over.
Interest rates were held down to negative levels in 
real terms.
The consequent rapid acceleration in price inflation 
to more than 500 per cent a year stimulated the outflow 
of private capital and caused black markets to proliferate, 
especially in foreign exchange. 1/ Not merely was the 
government unable to control demand; it did not have 
the power to introduce rationing either, except on an 
informal basis. In its last months, industrial 
production declined because of dwindling supplies of 
raw materials and spare parts, and big strikes, 
politically stimulated. Housewives faced growing 
shortages and queues and many joined public demons­
trations of protest. /
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
1. In 1972 a fascinating international conference on 
the government's policies, jointly organised by the 
Chilean planning office (ODEPLAN) and IDS, was held 
in Santiago. Participants from Communist countries 
could hardly conceal their shock at hearing one of 
Allende's ministers say that the exchange rate did 
not matter ("because the government controlled 
both exports and imports"!)
5The stage was set in 1973 for a reversal of policy here 
too. The geographical position of Chile, and the major 
investments there by US companies, made it much more 
vulnerable. Moreover, the government coalition,
'Popular Unity', was really somewhat misnamed - its 
popular base was never very broad or secure, and it 
consisted of a group of competing parties, each with 
their own trade union base and their own formula for 
socialism, blaming the others for 'reactionary' 
tendencies.
As earlier in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the 
pendulum has swung right back. 'Monetarist' policies 
have been imposed and opposition to them brutally 
repressed - but in this case under a 'Right-wing' 
banner.
Stephany's analysis is confined to these three leading 
cases. But there have been in fact several experiences 
in other parts of the world which confirm the pattern.
Let me briefly summarise them.
In Cuba post-revolutionary euphoria led in the 1960s 
to a contempt for financial policies, indeed even for 
money itself, more profound even than in the Soviet 
Union in 1918. Indeed state corporations ceased to
keep accounts. Massive Soviet aid prevented the
collapse of the regime, but in 1970 falling output and 
shortages of consumer goods led to social troubles 
(of a seriousness which we cannot judge from outside).
In this case, the government was able to carry through 
an almost complete reversal of policy, and there is 
now here too a new insistence on monetary incentives, 
balanced books, limits to supply of money, etc. A 
degree of unemployment appeared - and political controls 
have been tightened.
In Portugal, after the quasi-revolution of 1974, 
successive governments went through the same cycle.
Public expenditure increased rapidly and although the 
economic consequences were cushioned at first by a big 
stock of gold, the severe external disequilibrium 
forced in due course the adoption of restrictive 
financial policies and recourse to the IMF, with predict­
able consequences for social policy and unemployment.
The political pendulum swung gradually further to the 
Right.
6Michael Manley's government in Jamaica also let the 
financial situation get out of hand, partly because 
one of the two trade union organisations is controlled 
by the then opposition. Simultaneously, pro-Cuban 
rhetoric and measures against the bauxite companies 
led to a net flight of capital. The withdrawal of IMF 
support was hardly a surprise, and the deteriorating 
economic situation and increasing violence set the 
stage for an election which swept the government out 
of office and brought about a predictable reversal of 
policy.
Mildly socialist governments seem to show mild tendencies 
to financial irresponsibility with correspondingly less 
drastic consequences. Is it far-fetched to see certain 
parallels even in recent British history? The Labour 
government of 1974-79 could hardly be called socialist 
but it attempted to shield the working class from the 
consequences of the post-colonial economic decline, at 
the cost of budgetary discipline. Policy was already 
starting to swing in its closing years; the Chancellor, 
Dennis Healey, obtained from the IMF both financial and 
political support, but wages policy collapsed and here too 
the government was replaced by one dedicated to financial 
respectability, at the cost of rapidly rising unemploy­
ment, and civil liberties are under somewhat greater 
pressure.
How many more political disasters, one wonders, over how 
many decades have to take place before the Left draws 
the lessons of this book? In the first place, commit­
ments to wage increases, heavy investment in social 
infrastructure, etc., help a party gain power, but they 
greatly complicate its life once it has succeeded. The 
experience documented here shows that big gains of this 
kind cannot be made in the early years of socialist 
governments. These only take power at a time of 
national crisis, which leaves a legacy of financial 
disequilibrium. The civil service, inherited from the 
earlier regime, is unlikely to be willing, or even able, 
to implement far-reaching reforms. The structural 
changes that are attempted, such as land reforms and 
nationalisation, cause - in the first instance at least - 
disorganisation and declines in output. Capitalists, 
especially the transnational corporations, cut investment 
and export capital.
7A Left-wing political leader hoping to achieve power 
ought to ensure, especially after the experience of 
Chile, Jamaica, etc., that a proper financial policy, 
especially an incomes policy, is worked out in advance 
to cover this period of disorganisation. Yet no 
socialist party, to my knowledge, including the British 
Labour Party, attempts to do this. Honesty, if not 
mere prudence, also requires that even while still in 
opposition socialist leaders should not promise the 
public more than can actually be delivered - emphasising 
how much depends on oil prices and other factors outside 
their control. This might jeopardise the chance of 
victory, but we can now see that the victory may 
otherwise prove hollow and short lived.
The theorists and ideologues of the Left could also well 
turn from grand models of the world system and spare some 
attention for the following question: what financial
guidelines would meet the needs of socialist governments, 
especially in countries dependent on importing oil and 
exporting primary products that are subject to wild 
price fluctuations and harvest vicissitudes? When 
there are no agreed rules, all the finance minister in 
a Left-wing government can do is to nag his colleagues 
not to spend quite so much - before going to the other 
extreme becoming plus Friedmanite que Milton!
Such guidelines cannot of course go very far in general 
terms - much depends on the size of each economy; the 
composition of its balance of payments; its trade 
union policies; its productive structure; the nature 
of capital markets; the capacity of the public service 
(and its own political interests). One can, however, 
draw up a sort of check list of points to look for.
These would include the principles and machinery for an 
incomes policy; the limits on the supply of money (that 
have to take account of existing inflation and price 
rises due to structural change, but have nevertheless 
to be set somewhere); the rules for public corporations.
Financial guidelines are even more urgently needed now 
that the chronic foreign exchange surplus of oil-exporting 
countries is reflected in a chronic deficit in the 
rest of the world, a situation that can be expected to 
continue, on and off, for at least a decade (until 
alternative cheap sources of energy have been developed 
on a very large scale). Any socialist government 
taking office will almost certainly inherit a state of 
near-bankruptcy with low liquid external assets, heavy
8debts, and a trade deficit. (The above analysis suggests 
interesting questions about the Mitterand government in 
Paris (especially bearing in mind the experience of 
Leon Blum), and about future Polish policy.)
Sooner or later such governments seek help. The Soviet 
Union has barely enough capacity to support a handful 
of clients (Cuba, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen,
South Vietnam, etc.) There are of course many sources 
in the capitalist world - private and governmental - 
but rarely will any of them provide much capital until 
the International Monetary Fund has put its seal of 
approval on the financial policy.
Left-wing economists criticise the Fund's political 
bias, in insisting on the dismantling of controls 
(except of course those over wages), a bias not required 
by its Charter.These complaints are well-taken but 
they seem somewhat immature. What can one expect ,
from an institution controlled by the major capitalist 
governments, which gain from other economies being 
'open'? There is no secret about this control; they 
have the big majority of the voting power in its 
directorate.
In any case, the need for a strict financial policy 
does not arise, fundamentally, because of the prejudices 
of the IMF (useful though this may be as a whipping 
boy), nor even because of the strength of the capitalist 
powers. It arises out of the objective situation, 
especially the inconsistency between the aspirations 
of a socialist government's supporters, which will have 
been stimulated by 'consciousness raising', and the 
inevitable drop in living standards, at least in the 
short run, for the reasons outlined in this book. This 
is one of the typical internal contradictions in a new 
socialist state, and leads to the usual accelerating 
inflation, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, 
difficulties in financing essential imports, etc. etc. 
Indeed much of what the Fund imposes in 'condition­
ality' governments would have to carry out anyway, 
even if it did not exist. To my knowledge, Finance 
ministers, including socialists, who are at the end of 
their tether, and more so their officials, often 
secretly welcome powerful outside pressure on their 
cabinet colleagues to behave at least in ways more 
consistent with financial equilibrium.
Every Left-wing leader should buy this book and distribute 
it to those who may become Ministers. If it is widely 
circulated, the 1980s could prove a less disastrous 
decade for the Left.
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